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Abstract This paper documents some of the socio-technical
issues involved in developing security measures for
wireless mesh networks (WMNs) that are deployed as part
of a community network. We are interested in discovering
whether (and exactly how) everyday social interaction over
the network is affected by security issues, and any conse-
quent design implications. We adopt an interdisciplinary
methodological approach to requirements, treating a com-
munity as an ‘organization’ and implementing an approach,
OCTAVE, originally designed to uncover security ele-
ments for organizations. Using a focus group technique we
chart some of the assets and security concerns of the
community, concerns that need to be addressed in order for
WMNs, or indeed any network, to become a truly ‘mun-
dane technology’.
1 Introduction: mundane technologies and wireless
mesh networks
What is a mundane technology? Some might argue that
there are no mundane technologies merely mundane uses,
suggesting, for example, that technologies such as the
scalpel or the MRI scanner whilst mundane within medical
settings are likely to be regarded as fairly unusual, if not
illegal, elsewhere. Others might point to devices such as
the mobile phone, or word processing applications that
have a wide, almost universal availability and familiarity
and whose appearance is largely taken for granted and
unremarkable to suggest that there are such things as
mundane technologies. Still others, such as Petersen [23],
adopt a different position, talking about ‘mundane cyborg
practice’ and suggesting that as the Internet and the home
computer have become a mundane technology the concept
of mundane cyborg practice helps explain cyborg relations
as they unfold in everyday life. We want to sidestep this
debate by considering something that all positions effec-
tively embrace: the idea that somehow technologies
become mundane, and that they become mundane through
everyday use. While all designers might wish that their
technologies are universally desired and adopted, technol-
ogies are not born mundane but rather become so through
processes whereby, to put it simply, the technology is
adapted to and by the user, processes such as ‘domestica-
tion’ and ‘innofusion’ [14, 15, 24]); and the user adapts to
the technology, effectively ‘becoming a user’ [6]. Our
overall, and longstanding research interest, is in exactly
how and in what ways technology gets used and adapted; in
identifying the important global properties that shape
adoption and use; in looking at issues of reliability (issues
of trust and experience); explicitness (the tension between
trust and privacy); and coordinating and reconciling
information needs and resources. Such processes are
inevitably, irremediably linked to the social production of
trust, whereby a technology becomes a trusted technology
and its use and effects predictable and trustable—what
Sacks (1992) would call ‘at home in the world’. Some basic
sense of security that others are not accessing and using or
misusing your technology without your permission is an
obvious and central feature of the production of trust. So,
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while this paper is focused on a specific technology
(WMNs), deployed in a specific location, it also has a
wider and more ambitious concern—a concern with elec-
tronic networks in general and specifically with under-
standing the process of becoming ‘mundane’, suggesting
that this process is inextricably linked to related concerns
of security and trust.
Why do networks matter? Specifically why do they
matter for security, trust and the process of becoming
mundane? The sociologist Castells [9] identifies the net-
work as ‘‘the social structure characteristic of the Infor-
mation Age, … It permeates most societies in the world, in
various cultural and institutional manifestations, ..shifting
to the cultural realm, we see the emergence of a similar
pattern of networking, flexibility, and ephemeral symbolic
communication, in a culture organized primarily around an
integrated system of electronic media, obviously including
the Internet’’ [10]. With particular reference to wireless
networks, Mackenzie [21] argues, ‘‘wireless networks
persistently associate themselves into the centre of media
change. Their connectivity, intermittent, unstable and
uneven as it often is, lodges in many of the overlaps,
overflows and outgrowths badged as convergence, mobile
media, and pervasive or ubiquitous computing. …. It might
not be going too far to say that wireless networks are the
very substrate of network media convergence today. …
Because of their pre-positional power to connect subjects
and actions, wireless networks act conjunctively, they
conjoin circumstances, events, persons and things’’. Now
neither we, nor the good villagers of Wray, necessarily
need any sociologist to tell us of the importance of net-
works. What is interesting is Castells’ argument about the
emergent social forms of time and space that characterize
the network society, specifically ‘timeless time’ and the
‘space of flows’ [19]. ‘Timeless time’ refers to the com-
pression and de-sequencing of time whilst the ‘space of
flows’ refers to the use of technology to organize social
activities without the necessity of geographical proximity,
of being in the same place at the same time. So, whilst
previously the good villagers of Wray could only have their
houses burgled and their possessions stolen at particular
and obvious times of day and by someone who actually had
to come to their house in order to do the deed and could
therefore implement some rather obvious, and trusted
security measures; electronic networks now create the
possibility of them being robbed, electronically burgled, at
any time of the day and from almost anywhere on the
planet. Security and trust in this circumstance become
rather complex.
This paper is concerned with developing some under-
standing of the security and trust issues that both afford and
constrain people’s everyday or mundane social interactions
over the Web. The setting we are interested in is a rural
community using a wireless mesh network (or WMNs) to
provide access to the Web. The Web is, of course, a prime
example of a ‘mundane technology’ as a seemingly quite
unremarkable, simple technology that has been ‘made at
home’ in people’s lives, has become ‘ordinary’, perhaps
even ‘invisible’—at least in the sense that people rarely
consider, or give more than a passing thought to, the
technologies that ensure access. For some, however, and
particularly for designers, this very ‘invisibility’ means that
issues of security and trust need to be made far more
transparent that people need to be aware of the vulnera-
bilities of the technology they routinely use and designers
need to be aware of users’ security concerns, not least
because of the impact such issues have on people’s trust
and very sense of community. It is in this sense, and with
this focus on security that we are interested in WMN as a
technology that both provides an account of, and makes us
account for, our actions; in the kinds of visibility that
technology enforces despite its ‘embeddedness’ and
‘invisibility’; and in the importance of the relationship
between ordinary technologies and notions of space and
place, particularly the notion of ‘community’.
Wireless Mesh Networks are being increasingly used to
provide affordable network connectivity to communities
where wired deployment strategies are impossible or
unreasonably expensive—for example, in rural areas. Such
communities rely on WMNs to bridge what is sometimes
referred to as the ‘digital divide’, the separation between
those with high quality Internet access and those without,
and they are proving to be particularly valuable to indi-
viduals, community activities and local businesses [4].
Unfortunately, computer networks are frequently being
exploited by recreational and professional attackers that
can affect their utility for legitimate use, especially in the
more unusual networking scenarios presented in commu-
nity WMNs. In response to the general threat a number of
counter measures have been developed, including intrusion
prevention systems such as network firewalls, and intrusion
detection systems that aim to detect anomalous behaviour
caused by attacks; unfortunately these technical responses
are not directly applicable in a community WMN.
This paper documents and seeks to understand some of
the socio-technical issues involved with developing secu-
rity measures for WMNs that are deployed in and as part of
a community network. These communities may have very
different approaches to network management and operation
when compared to the understood norm in computer net-
work security, alongside the obvious technical complica-
tions. By emphasising the socio-technical we suggest that
security provision extends beyond a narrow technical
emphasis to include the perceptions, knowledge and fears
of users. This information may well impact on the success
or failure of security policies and the eventual use and
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usefulness of the network, especially in the community
environment ie, the extent to which it becomes a ‘mundane
technology’. Our interest is then in gaining some under-
standing of ‘domestication’ as a precursor to design, in
order that technologies may be created that might
encourage the process of domestication that might facilitate
the process of ‘becoming mundane’. At the heart of this
argument is the notion that whilst the process of domesti-
cation and its key elements have been well described [24],
fundamental to this process is some notion of trust, some
belief in the security of the network being utilized.
However, getting some analytical purchase on exactly
how a community feels about security, what their fears and
(mis)perceptions might be, and translating them into
security policies and protocols is far from easy, and per-
haps relies on skills and practices not obviously associated
with security experts or even computer scientists. In this
project therefore, we deliberately adopt an interdisciplinary
approach, and this paper presents our efforts to understand
whether the formalization of an OCTAVE [2] style pro-
cess, a user-driven and asset-centric process, to identify an
appropriate security strategy in a community WMN is both
possible and useful.
2 Problems of security in wireless mesh networks
Wireless mesh networks create a networking infrastructure
using a combination of wireless networking technologies
and ad-hoc routing protocols. They are effectively self-
managing networks in which a set of nodes in the network
act as routers that route traffic directly or via multi-hop
paths, typically to the Internet. The system is dynamic in
that it is able to adapt to nodes entering and exiting the
network, perhaps as a result of a node failure or poor
wireless connectivity, resulting in a flexible, easy to oper-
ate network, highly suited to situations such as communi-
ties where time for network management is at a minimum.
In comparison to other network types (e.g., the wired
Internet and cellular networks), WMNs are particularly
vulnerable to attacks due both to the number of available
attack vectors, and the severe consequences of attacks that
may take place. The attack space is particularly large, in
addition to conventional attacks which apply to both wired
(e.g., Internet Worms) and wireless (e.g., jamming) net-
works, they can also suffer from attacks to the network
control traffic (e.g., forwarding infrastructure) because of
the ease of physical access. This makes it relatively
straightforward to capture, clone or tamper with wireless
hops and orchestrate an attack. This suggests there is a set
of challenging technical problems to address with regard to
security on WMNs. However, in a community network
scenario the users probably do not possess the knowledge
required to consider and address these challenges. They
may also have very different conceptions of what a security
threat might be or what kind of response might be appro-
priate. Furthermore, considering security will likely require
a greater degree of network administration, perhaps making
a WMN less self-managing. These are all predominantly
social concerns, perhaps even mundane issues, and
potentially far more difficult to identify and address than
technical concerns. It is evident therefore that to address
the problems of security in community WMNs we need to
adopt a socio-technical approach.
We have seen little research that has concerned itself
with some of the important socio-technical issues involved
in determining security requirements in community set-
tings. It is in this sense that this research requires some
interdisciplinary sensitivities, not least in a concern with
exactly how certain basic questions might be posed to
users: what are users afraid of?, what do they value that’s
worth protecting?, how much do they want to be involved?,
how automated do they want the process to be?, etc. and
what weight we need to attach to their answers. As Agre [1]
argues; ‘‘The design of community networks can support
positive values in this complicated world, but only so long
as the designers understand what they are getting into.’’
We would like to have some greater awareness of exactly
what kind of security issues we are getting into. What we
are aiming at in this project is then an awareness of and
sensitivity towards a range of user concerns that may in
turn impinge on and inform approaches to the security of
the network. Like Dourish et al. [11, 12] then, we also
stress the ways in which security issues and perceptions are
inevitably embedded in complex social and cultural con-
texts. The particular context we wish to explicate is that of
communal life.
3 WMN in the community: communities, technology
and design
The WMN, and the community, we are interested in is
Wray, a small, relatively remote village in the north of
Lancashire, where the community felt strongly that the lack
of broadband availability (a consequence of their remote-
ness) in their village was jeopardising local businesses,
education and impacting on other aspects of community
life. It has a population of less than 500 and has a single
post office and general store, two pubs, a cafe´, a parish
church, a school, a village hall and a single main street.
In early 2004, a Lancaster University-led project into
wireless mesh networking provided the community with
access to broadband—their remote location meant that
their only option for Internet access had been a slow (often
unreliable) dial-up service. The University built a WMN
Pers Ubiquit Comput (2010) 14:227–236 229
123
within the village to investigate the resilience and
capabilities of the technology, offering Internet access to
residents in their homes and at public locations around the
village. For our purposes, it appeared a thriving, interesting
and (for research purposes) convenient community.
The WMN is deployed in Wray as a ‘community’ net-
work. Undoubtedly the word ‘community’ is a feelgood
word, for as Bauman [5] argues: ‘‘It feels good: whatever
the word ‘community’ may mean, it is good ‘to have a
community’, ‘to be in a community’’’. However, it is evi-
dently the case that social, economic and technological
changes have altered the nature, importance and influence
of ‘community’ Wellman [30, 31], so exactly what the
expectations are for a community network is open to some
debate.
Technology allows for the use and maintenance of any
dispersed social network, so ‘community’ may have little
to do with the individual’s geographical location, but
become instead an achieved social construct of mutual ties,
orientations and obligations. But technology alone has no
obvious relationship with any sense of community and can
evidently either reinforce or fragment community and
community life, depending on the interaction between
technologies (and their affordances) and particular com-
munities (and their dynamics). Our interest in affordances
and dynamics is, in this particular case, shaped by a con-
cern for security. As Mynatt et al. [22] note, the essential
features of community are to do with boundaries, rela-
tionships and change—values and emphases that corre-
spond fairly well with a range of security concerns. For
example, the boundaries of community are not just spatial
but also relational, social, technological, institutional, etc.
Indeed, fundamental to this notion of ‘community’ is the
notion of ‘place’ that Harrison and Dourish [17] define as
‘‘a space which is invested with understandings of behav-
ioural appropriateness, cultural expectations, and so
forth.’’ This therefore incorporates some notion of ‘mem-
bership’ (and of awareness of membership) of inclusion
and exclusion. But this is not to reinvent Parsonian or
Durkheimian notions of the ‘moral order’, nor is it to
simply suggest that ‘community’ is merely constituted in
opposition to ‘outsiders’—though this division can be
important. Instead we are trying to point to various sub-
tleties in a community’s own understandings of the notion;
of the multifarious ways in which ‘community’ is based on
meaningful and multi-layered relationships that are sig-
nificant and persistent for members. These relations
become a mutual source of orientation and definition of
appropriate and inappropriate behaviours and values. In
this way the ‘community’ establishes expectations and
responsibilities, these might be said to be the ‘mundane
features’ of everyday communal life, indeed they are, as
Hobbes argued, what make communal life possible at all,
avoiding a life that is ‘solitary poor, nasty, brutish and
short’. These mundane features will include notions of
reciprocity and commitment as well as shared values and
practices; values and practices that may well include
adhering to a range of basic security protocols and prac-
tices. In the everyday world this might include simple
maxims such as remembering to lock doors and close
windows, or not to take sweets from strangers; on the
Internet it might include injunctions to close down appli-
cations, to protect passwords and not to open attachments
from ‘strangers’—and from neighbours whose approach to
security might be very different and occasionally less than
desirable.
4 Methodological issues in understanding security
Friedman et al. [16] in ‘Users Conceptions of Web Secu-
rity’ suggest we need to help users construct more accurate
understandings of security. Such understandings can take
various forms but they both point to the fragility of users
understandings and appreciation of security, documenting
both how users mistakenly understand and evaluate secu-
rity. In large part this is because as Edwards et al. [13]
argue, and our own focus group studies confirm, for most
users, security is simply not a paramount, sometimes not
even a conscious, goal, often being merely incidental to the
particular task at hand (see also [7]). However, the obvious
solution of automating security faces profound technical
and social factors that diminish the acceptance and efficacy
of automated end-user security solutions. Failure to cor-
rectly identify stakeholders and stakeholder values; to
identify and meet users’ needs are at the heart of many of
the problems of ‘usable security’ and initiated our interest
in forms of stakeholder analysis using an established focus
group method and the eventual design and deployment of
technology probes.
While it seems essential that measures are taken to
determine the most probable and damaging attacks for a
particular network, in order to make best use of the limited
monetary, time and computing resources that are available
in a community WMN context, determining exactly how to
proceed appropriately in a community, as opposed to a
more easily understood business, context is complex. How
can we best proceed to understand security in a community
WMN? And importantly, how can we understand it in a
way that is useful and informative to design
considerations?
One approach to this involves identifying the most
vulnerable ‘assets’ associated with an organization (those
that, if exploited, would have the highest impact, and
also those that have the highest probability of being
attacked) and the vulnerabilities associated with them.
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Within business settings there exists the Operationally
Critical Threat, Asset and Vulnerability Evaluation
(OCTAVE) method [2] to determine an enterprise’s
critical assets and the technical vulnerabilities associated
with them.
The motivation for adopting an OCTAVE-like
approach in a community context is compelling. The
method defines a set of principles; for example, the pro-
cess of determining a security strategy should be led by
the organization itself—an attractive proposition in our
context because of the probable lack of funding for
expensive security consultancy. Assets form the basis on
which a security strategy is developed—given the largely
non-technical user-base in Wray, who may have an idea
of what they want to protect, but not how to achieve it,
defining assets is an approachable starting point that could
be built upon by more a more technically adept subset of
the community. A process like OCTAVE brings to the
fore security trade-offs, which will have an important role
in forming a security strategy in this context—consider
the ‘how do I want to be involved?’ question. However,
determining how best a community could go about this
process, potentially by itself, raises a number of important
and interesting methodological issues.
The original OCTAVE method is intended for use in
large corporate, military, and governmental organizations.
Based upon the OCTAVE principles further methods can
be developed for use in different contexts. One such
method is OCTAVE-S, specifically created for use in
businesses with less than 100 employees. The process is
carried out by much smaller groups of people, knowl-
edgeable about the network they are assessing. Meetings
are held to create asset-based threat profiles, which
involves identifying what exists on the network that is
valuable, and ranking their value according to perceived
necessity and importance. The second step is to identify
vulnerabilities in the networking infrastructure that could
affect the assets that have been identified as most critical.
The last step is to take the information from steps one and
two and identify specific risks that combine the vulnera-
bilities and assets, and from that develop security strategies
to mitigate potential problems.
But can a process such as OCTAVE-S be easily trans-
posed to a community WMN context? In what ways, and to
what extent, is a community like a business or an organi-
zation? Or a business like a community? Understanding
some of the relevant differences and similarities between a
business and a community forms part of the bedrock of
modern sociological analysis as reflected in Tonnies’ [29]
seminal work on Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. The detail
of this debate need not concern us: basically a business is
an organization that is planned, rational and purposeful in
pursuit of a restricted range of goals associated with the
development, production and sale of a particular product or
service. A community is an organization or group of some
kind that shares, to a greater or lesser extent, particular
values, resources and beliefs. Our interest and our analysis
is concerned with whether subtle differences in motivation,
expectation and involvement come to be reflected in
security concerns—in ideas about assets that need to be
protected or threats that might be identified. While assets
such as those in an enterprise setting obviously exist, the
set of assets to protect in a community WMN context may
be quite different. However, there is no overwhelming
theoretical or methodological reason why a community
cannot be treated like an organization and there are obvious
advantages of comprehensiveness and generalizability to
be gained from adopting a structured approach like
OCTAVE, particularly when combined with other quali-
tative approaches to security requirements, since their
combination permits us to explore some of the subtleties of
determining security issues.
Obviously certain aspects, relevant to security—like a
concern with boundaries, relationships and change—are
common to both communities and businesses, even if the
motivations behind them, the contrasting motivations of
profit and sociality, may be very different. Other assets,
such as privacy, trust, identity, reputation or safety may
also manifest themselves very differently, and have dif-
ferent priorities within a community setting. For example,
while businesses and communities share much the same
legal framework, their orientation to issues of privacy, e-
mail privacy for example, may, for very good and com-
pelling legal reasons, be entirely different.
There are also a range of difficult practical organiza-
tional issues to be faced, determining exactly the who, how,
where and when to hold the kind of meeting required by an
OCTAVE-like approach to security. For example, can a
group of three to five people sufficiently know the usage
and organization of a network to carry out the process on
behalf of everyone else? Probably not, we think.
Nevertheless, as part of a methodologically eclectic
project we are currently investigating ways that an
activity such as OCTAVE could be carried out in the
context of the Wray village network, using, as an initial
approach, the mechanism of focus groups in order to
identify the assets and current security practices of the
villagers. In this fashion, we hoped to test the applica-
bility and the boundaries of the OCTAVE approach and
perhaps identify areas for further development or sup-
plementation in this particular setting. We aimed then to
investigate the use of the core OCTAVE ideas and the
available prior knowledge in this area, but extending it to
apply in a community environment, thereby hopefully
empowering community users to ensure the security of
their own networks.
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5 Implementing an OCTAVE method approach
to community security
We embarked on an OCTAVE-S like approach by setting
up a focus group meeting in the village cafe´—a setting
intended to overcome at least some of the artificiality of a
focus group approach, and further enabled by the fact that
we have been involved in research and development in this
community for some considerable time and using a variety
of techniques [28]. The focus group was facilitated by
members of the project team and a number of villagers,
with a variety of interests, experience and expertise (from
business users of the WMN to those who only used it for
leisure or family purposes), were invited to come along and
discuss their use of the WMN and any security concerns
they might have. In this fashion, we hoped to obtain some
specific empirical data on WMN users concerns about
security issues such as identity theft, privacy, and so on,
reflecting people’s actual, as opposed to imagined, security
worries.
In a wide-ranging discussion various issues were raised.
As part of an attempt to begin the process of identifying
assets, the session began with coffee and cakes (another
‘mundane technology’) and some fairly general questions
about security, safety and storage.
Focus Group Extract 1 (simplified abbreviated transcript)
P (project team)—what sort of things do you have stored
on your computers?… This is potentially private, so
don’t think we’re forcing you to tell us. Who are you
comfortable sharing those things with?. Are you partic-
ularly concerned about keeping any of those things safe?
V1 (villager)—Personal, family photos saved, no neg-
atives any more, etc., work stuff - invoices, time sheets,
tax, data files. .. things that are critical to keep
P—If someone got them who wasn’t supposed to have
them would that cause a problem?
V1—Would be bad, could be terrible for the company.
Like when building a new rig, industrial espionage…. I
don’t have these printed out so much, use Linux, I go
away a lot so I keep a regular back up at my brother’s
[house], if someone stole the laptop there would be a
second copy somewhere else.
V2—Billions of photographs, backed up onto a portable
hard disk. Village website, also on the community
laptop, and also on the desktop and the portable storage.
Backs up to Gmail, lots of accounts. ..always have
access to them somewhere else, then. Bank details held
in the web interface, books for the business held.
Wouldn’t like people going to look at my computer, but
nothing especially to hide. Anyone I know can look.
More bothered about phishing emails, can see lots of
people being taken in. …thinking about protecting
unwary people.
V3—Personal computer doesn’t have much on I’d be
worried about others seeing. Keep the village details,
backs up every 3 months or so. .. There are issues with
people having financial business accounts which can’t
be shown prior to trading, can’t release the information
before a certain time…Don’t store passwords on the
machine. Do Internet banking, want that to be safe.
V4—Ran a business, closed down a few years ago, still
receiving information.. correspondence, personal stuff,
but not confidential. .. I don’t want to lose my photos, but
aren’t of much interest to other people.
V5—Photos saved… correspondence is kept. That’s
about all. I’m worried about phishing, how do they get
your address? One of them the web browser said it was a
phishing attack, the other didn’t.
V3—You shouldn’t click! ..they can install spyware on
your computer by visiting the page.
V2—If you hover over the link in the email you can see
where the link is taking you.
V6—Photographs, and emails, but only pictures I’d be
sad to lose. I don’t do anything to keep them safe, my son
put some on a CD, but I’m bad about that.
V7—I have no work stuff on my personal computer, only
on laptop that’s backed up at work. .. at a personal level,
don’t keep passwords saved,…. Take backups, put
photos on DVD every month. .. you can’t lose memories,
I wouldn’t want to throw them away, but losing a few
photos, I’m not worried about…
V8—Same as V7, I’ve worked in a business, seen people
cry when their data has been lost and not backed up. I
put stuff on a CD, I use the mother in-law’s house as an
external backup place. Purely because if you have
something stolen, it’s important to keep photos safe, and
other things. …it’s all about risk, what you conceive the
risk to the data to be.
In this brief, abbreviated extract we see some of the
villagers concerns about security begin to surface. These
concerns focus on the security of personal information,
photographs and business information. We also see that
these concerns have evoked a range of personal, individual
solutions in terms of back-up, storage and secrecy.
Although the researchers facilitated the discussion, it is
fairly obvious that within a short period of time comments
and contributions are freely given and exchanged and are
not just a simple product of the focus group format. The
discussion then began to focus on more specific concerns
about safety and about the possible malicious use of the
network—either by those in the village or outsiders:
Focus Group Extract 2 (simplified abbreviated transcript)
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P—what are your concerns, safety concerns on the
network? People are worried about losing things, do you
have any other worries .. when using your computer on
the Internet?
V8—I worry about identity, what you’ve done on the
network, or how people can pretend you’ve done things,
.. something maybe you’ve never done, or the worst thing
you’ve done.… maybe if I dislike you I could make stuff
up and tell people bad things about you.
V3—kids do this on Bebo! pretend to be other people…
V9—…I work with people who are scared of their
teenage children on chatrooms. They get worried. In
their rooms with their mates fiddling about..
P—You have kids who use the computer, do you have
concerns?
V7—They are pretty sensible, MSN requires them to
accept people they know. They talk to their friends, don’t
talk to random people. They’re not using social network-
ing sites, only communicating with people they know.
V3—Social networking, friends of friends are the issue,
..two clicks and it’s nasty.
V8—Friends Reunited, someone made a site about
someone else, a silly one, people thought it was true.
How do they authenticate a person as themselves?.
V2—Someone in the village made a Bebo page, .. posted
pictures of herself on the Internet. Linked to that are
pictures of V3’s children.
In this extract the villagers fears about security are
focused not on their possessions but on themselves and
their children; about the possibilities of identity theft, of
possible defamation, the problem of really knowing who
one is talking to and the possible consequences of using
chatrooms or social networking sites ‘‘two clicks and its
nasty’’. Finally, there was also some unprompted discus-
sion on the specific security of the WMN:
Focus Group Extract 3 (simplified abbreviated transcript)
P—… interested to know if there are concerns that are
mesh specific?
V7—If I were using a wired network, would I be more
secure? What access does the university have to see the
data being transferred? These are the questions that
occur to me. I don’t worry about people accessing my
computer specifically, have a wireless network in my
house controlled by MAC address.
P—At the moment you’re not sure if you’re better off on
the wired network or mesh network?
V7—Yes.
V2—Same as this person who thinks it’s not as secure.
V3—It probably isn’t as secure as wired, but not as
insecure as the messages in windows ‘‘unsecured
network connection’’ would imply.
V2—Is it any less safe using the Uni[versity]? Normal
ISPs still have to record information.
V8—Always make sure you understand anyone could be
watching your network traffic…. Mesh network is
wireless, if you buy a cable from BT, that goes through
to their network. they own and manage it. If you connect
to Wray you won’t specifically know you are connecting
to Wray … in the same way as making a connection to a
BT exchange.
V3—If you run a home network without restrictions, you
have the same problems, your network could spill out
into other houses.
V8—No disrespect, but someone could have your MAC
address in seconds.
These three short extracts give some flavour of precisely
how, in the course of the focus group session, a range of
fears and vulnerabilities (real or imagined) were identified.
These included; mesh infrastructure spoofing; specific tar-
geting of information stored, for reasons of industrial
espionage; phishing emails and how to deal with them;
breaking hard-drive data encryption; identity theft, or
knowledge about usage; lack of security stopping people
gaining direct access to the WMN; fear of downloading
something and not realizing or knowing what it’s doing.
They also illustrate the interesting interplay between a
purely technical view of security and a socio-technical
view where users interests, fears and concerns, including
their misunderstandings and misconceptions, are identified
and then taken account of in the design process.
The focus group also enabled us to begin the OCTAVE-
style process of identifying ‘assets’, including:
• stored photographs and work documents;
• unfettered use of the home computer;
• personal information stored on the computer;
• privacy—of browsing habits, etc.;
• personal identity and reputation—protection from theft
and damage or unauthorized use;
• children—and the protection of children from various
forms of exploitation or abuse;
• safety and security of the less computer literate
members of the community;
• and access to the Internet with a high quality connection
allowing; remote access, teleconferencing and Skype.
What is interesting from an interdisciplinary view is the
way in which conventional sociological interests in com-
munity are also reflected in these readily identified security
concerns and assets. It might also be argued that the concerns
voiced by the villagers reflect precisely the kinds of issues
that need to be dealt with in order for the technology to
become ‘domesticated’, to be tamed, to become ‘mundane’.
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One obvious example is the worry about membership (who
‘belongs’); since recognizable members and membership
categories, allied with recognizable boundaries can be uti-
lized as initial filters for suspicion and trust. Similarly, the
allied concern with identity and representation over the
WMN; how people can represent themselves and manage
their ‘identities’ as a means for ensuring both the security of
their identity and their trusted interactions with others; and
managing spatial relations in order to integrate the ‘real’ and
the ‘virtual’ also reflect common sociological tropes. These
involve having ideas about exactly where people, who are
interacting via the WMN, might be in time and space as part
of the common grounds for shared, for trusted, expectations
and comprehension of behaviour. Finally, an expressed
desire for a security-related FAQ sheet clearly points to
ongoing aspects of community development and history that
the community should be able to reflect and learn from
experience, to develop ‘robust sociality’.
Above all, and with a few notable exceptions, our focus
groups suggest that our respondents were not especially
interested in security—they just wanted their machines to
work. Indeed a number of them likened computer systems
to their cars, they did not want to look under the bonnet and
know how they worked, they did not really want to think
about them at all, they just wanted them to work every
time. As Kindberg et al. [18] suggest ‘‘people bring to bear
very different kinds of reasons when making judgments
about technologies. Trust and security issues may play a
role, but other kinds of issue may be equally or even more
important, like ease of use and convenience, or social ones.
These other kinds of issue may be deliberately traded off or
discounted in making decisions and reasoning about
technology’’. Our research further illustrates how difficult
people find it to talk about, represent or understand secu-
rity, unless they themselves have experienced a security
breach or it is the subject of a current media panic. But
failing to foresee the future, and future security needs, is
not a particular, reprehensible failing of our sample or our
community but it does make gathering requirements and
design rather more difficult, since it is not only designing
for the (unknown) future but designing in the face of
indifference. It does, however, contribute to what Stewart
and Williams [27] call ‘the design fallacy’ whereby par-
ticular and unchanging values are attributed to users, users
responses to technology in the form of ‘domestication’ [25]
and ‘innofusion’ [14, 15] are ignored and, in consequence
the system or application becomes increasingly divorced
from and irrelevant to user needs. Stewart and Williams
point to the importance of social learning over the lifecycle
of the design and deployment of a technology, the pro-
cesses of domestication and innofusion that are rarely
considered in the understanding and evaluation of design.
We agree and also concur with another conclusion that;
‘‘design must confront the inevitable metaphorical leap in
creating a representation of ‘the user’ in a context of
incomplete information about current users and their
requirements (let alone future users who do not yet exist).’’
But saying things are difficult is not a reason for aban-
donment, however, superficially attractive that might seem,
and we suggest that the eclectic methodological combina-
tions presented here indicate our attempts to develop some
sensitivity towards initial user requirements, to tap into and
respond to changes in both user requirements and changing
user populations.
6 Conclusion: ‘Becoming Mundane’—designing
for social interaction with mundane technologies
This paper, and this research, has been interested in
exploring aspects of security and trust as understood by
potential users as a pre-cursor to design. That is, whilst
previous research on domestication has taken an existing
technology and speculated as to exactly why and how it has
been incorporated into everyday life this approach has
attempted to use security and trust as a predictor of the
likely acceptance, the likely domestication of a technology.
While previous research has examined the deployment
and modification in use of a technology as providing
insights into the process of domestication, this research has
attempted to operate at a more fundamental level, to look at
the potential basis of the domestication process, to examine
notions of security and trust, and thereby design such that
technology facilitates domestication. This research is
obviously at an early stage but what clearly emerges from
the work so far is the importance of an interdisciplinary
approach to the topic of security, since getting a useful
understanding of user fears and expectations requires the
deployment and appreciation of social scientific method-
ologies and analytic frameworks.
In this fashion, traditional approaches to design that
focus only on the relative importance of particular func-
tionalities and their relative cost can be supplemented,
supported or challenged by reference to user concerns and
interests. So, for example, initially, and perhaps unsur-
prisingly, we focused on identity theft as an assumed focus
of concern for residents within Wray, but the initial focus
group has shown little indication of people having any
great fear in that area. In a similar fashion we quickly
realized the importance of providing some form of expla-
nation of security in the WMN since it is evident that
people in the village are not completely aware of the
organization and security of the Wray network as it cur-
rently stands. There is a general lack of understanding
regarding precisely how secure the network is (or is not).
In such a setting any ‘improvements’ to security need to be
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carefully introduced and explained if they are going to be
appreciated. A number of people in the focus group
requested a Q&A or FAQ sheet to outline and explain basic
security information, whilst others mentioned the need for
some form of security education over the WMN, either to
help allay people’s fears or to raise awareness of security
issues. Finally, the focus group suggested ways in which a
number of group concerns could be addressed by intro-
ducing security measures on the Wray network through;
increased security for identifying the Wray mesh boxes to
the clients; increased security for authenticating clients on
the network; and IDS or anomaly detection systems iden-
tifying when people’s computers are behaving in a suspi-
cious manner and may be compromised.
In the context of a community we were interested ini-
tially in teasing out, in explicating, people’s particular
ideas and concerns about security—together with a method
to accomplish this—alongside understanding the various
complex technical challenges before commencing the
extremely difficult task of somehow meshing these very
different aspects together: developing a technology that is
sensitive to user concerns and a user community sensitive
to the requirements and limitations of the technology. What
we are seeing here are the social processes of trust pro-
duction [20] for it is in just such a fashion that a technology
becomes trusted’ as Silverstone [26] (even if he was talking
about a different trusted technology, television) suggests:
‘‘For most of us, most of the time, our natural attitude in
the taken-for-granted world is one which enables us to
maintain our sanity in our passage through life and the
daily round. Routines, habits …and the consistencies with
which our interactions with each other conform to expec-
tations, together provide the infrastructure for a moral
universe in which we, its citizens, can go about our daily
business. Through learning to trust others we learn, one
way or another, to trust things. And likewise, through
learning to trust material things we learn to trust abstract
things. Trust is therefore achieved and sustained through
the ordinariness of everyday life and the consistencies of
both language and experience.’’
We freely admit that we are not the first (nor likely the
last) to try and understand the social and cultural aspects of
security. Like Dourish and Anderson [11], we agree that
the dominant model of security is overly abstract and
neglects social practices. In their formulation, our emphasis
has been on security as a practical accomplishment. Con-
sequently we agree that formulations of security are rela-
tively unpredictable products of myriad social and cultural
encounters; that an emphasis on use and on an under-
standing of trust in relation to flows of information is
important and that we may be able to engage in more
effective design interventions by looking at collective
information practice. Like Dourish and Anderson, we have
‘attempted to place technological privacy and security
concerns within social and cultural contexts’ intending that
any design or technical application reflects and incorpo-
rates the understandings achieved. We have done this
through a structured research method—OCTAVE—which
provides a way of understanding the social and cultural
practices that underpin technical specifications of security.
The method and the approach carries with it a range of
important implications—and problems. Some of the prob-
lems concern exactly how we might go about understand-
ing these issues and documenting them in a fashion that
may prove useful to design, given that the end-product of
our understanding is to improve design in some way. We
believe that many of these problems in understanding
social and cultural practices and then designing them into a
technology are not well understood.
Our approach differs from previous attempts [11, 12] in
that our emphasis is on community life, practices, values
and associated issues of boundaries relationships and
change that may be different from those found either
individually or in workplace settings. Our interests there-
fore extend beyond detailing existing individual security
practices, practices that people are likely to implement, to
uncovering aspects of social, communal life that people
think are worth keeping secured. We suggest that these
may be key to understanding the ways in which technol-
ogies may become mundane. In attempting to apply and
develop a structured methodological approach to under-
standing community security requirements, we document
communal sets of values and practices held in common, the
very things, some might say that security policies and
protocols are designed to defend, and the very things that
are likely to contribute most to a technology ‘becoming
mundane’.
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